Abstract
Introduction
Context of this Study: Wireless ad-hoc networks are formed when an ad-hoc collection of devices equipped with wireless communication capabilities happen to be in proximity to each other [40] . Clearly, each pair of such devices whose distance is less than their transmission range can communicate directly with each other. Moreover, if some devices occasionally volunteer to act as forwarders, it is possible to form a multiple hop ad-hoc network. An important distinguishing element of these networks from "standard" networks is that they do not rely on any preexisting infrastructure or management authority. Also, due to their ad-hoc nature and device mobility, there is no sub-netting to assist routing and data dissemination decisions. Moreover, due to mobility, the physical structure of the network is constantly evolving.
Semi-reliable broadcast is a basic service for many collaborative applications as it provides nearly reliable dissemination of the same information to many recipients. It ensures that most messages will be received by most nodes. Yet, implementing semi-reliable broadcast in an efficient manner, and in particular over a wireless ad-hoc network, is far from trivial. It involves ensuring that a message is forwarded to all nodes as well as overcoming possible message losses.
Unlike infrastructure based networks in which routers are usually considered to be trusted entities, in ad-hoc networks routing is performed by the devices themselves. Thus, there is a high risk that some of the nodes of an ad-hoc network will act in a Byzantine manner, or in other words, would not respect the networking protocols. This can be due to maliciousness, or simply selfishness (trying to save battery power). Thus, the possibility of having Byzantine nodes in the system motivates the development of Byzantine tolerant broadcast protocols for ad-hoc networks.
The simplest way to obtain broadcast in a multiple hop network is by employing flooding [39] . That is, the sender sends the message to everyone in its transmission range. Each device that receives a message for the first time delivers it to the application and also forwards it to all other devices in its range. While this form of dissemination is very robust, it is also very wasteful and may cause a large number of collisions.
Hence, many multicast/broadcast protocols maintain an overlay, which can be thought of as a logical topology superimposed over the physical one, e.g., [22, 35, 41, 42] . The overlay typically covers all nodes, yet each node has a limited number of neighbors. Given an overlay, broadcast messages are flooded only along the arcs of the overlay, thereby reducing the number of messages sent as well as the number of collisions. The overlay composition and structure may be determined by either deterministic or probabilistic methods, and they can change dynamically over time.
On the other hand, having an efficient overlay reduces the robustness of the broadcast protocol against failures, and in particular against Byzantine behavior of overlay nodes. One way around this is to maintain f + 1 node independent overlays, where f is the assumed maximal number of Byzantine devices, and flood each message along each of these overlays, guaranteeing that each message will eventually arrive despite possible Byzantine nodes [13, 29, 31] .
The price paid by this approach is that every message has to be sent f + 1 times even if in practice none of the devices suffered from a Byzantine fault. Here, we propose an approach that reduces this overhead to a single overlay when there are no Byzantine failures.
Contribution of this Work:
This paper presents an efficient Byzantine tolerant broadcast protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks. The protocol is based on the following principles: The protocol employs an overlay on which messages are disseminated. In parallel, signatures about these messages are being gossiped by all nodes in the system in an unstructured manner. This allows all nodes to learn about the existence of a message even if some of the overlay nodes fail to forward them, e.g., if they are Byzantine or due to collisions. When a node learns about a message it is missing, it requests the missing message from another node that has it. The benefit of this approach comes from the fact that message signatures are typically much smaller than the messages themselves. Moreover, as gossips are sent periodically, multiple gossip messages are aggregated into one packet, thereby greatly reducing the number of messages generated by the protocol.
Additionally, the protocol employs several failure detectors in order to eliminate from the overlay nodes that act a noticeable Byzantine manner. Specifically, we rely on a mute failure detector, a verbose failure detector, and a trust failure detector. The mute failure detector detects when a process has failed to send a message with an expected header [15] . The verbose failure detector detects when a node sends messages too often. Finally, the trust failure detector reports suspicions of a faulty behavior of nodes based on the other two failure detectors and the history of nodes. Interestingly, the failure detectors that we use only detect benign failures, such as a failure to send a message with an expected header, sending too many messages, or trying to forge a signed message. They do not detect, for example, sending messages with inconsistent data, or sending messages with different data to different processes. Thus, their properties can be detected locally and they can be implemented in an eventually synchronous environment, such as the timedasynchronous model [14] , regardless of the ratio between the number of Byzantine processes and the entire set of processes. Combining this with digital signatures is enough to overcome Byzantine failures.
An important aspect of our failure detector based approach is its modularity, as they encapsulate timing requirements behind a timeless functional specification. The use of failure detectors greatly simplifies the protocol's structure and enables us to present it with an asynchronous design. This is often considered more elegant and robust than synchronous alternatives, in which timing assumptions are explicit.
The result is a protocol that sends a small number of messages when all nodes behave correctly most of the time. The paper also includes a detailed performance evaluation carried by simulation.
System Model and Definitions
In this work we focus on wireless mobile systems consisting of a collection of nodes placed in a given finite size area. A node in the system is a device owning an omni-directional antenna that enables wireless communication. A transmission of a node p can be received by all nodes within a disk centered on p whose radius depends on the transmission power, referred to in the following as the transmission disk ; the radius of the transmission disk is called the transmission range. Combining the nodes and the transitive closure of their transmission disks forms a wireless ad-hoc network.
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We denote the transmission range of device p by r p . This means that a node q can only receive messages sent by p if the distance between p and q is smaller than r p . A node q is a direct neighbor of another node p if q is located within the transmission disk of p. In the following, N (1, p) refers to the set of direct neighbors of a node p and N (k, p) refers to the transitive closure with length k of N (1, p). By considering N (1, p) as a relation (defining the set N (1, p)), we say that a node p has a path to a node q if q appears in the transitive closure of the N (1, p) relation.
As nodes can physically move, there is no guarantee that a neighbor q of p at time t will remain in the transmission disk of p at a later time t > t. Additionally, messages can be lost. For example, if two nodes p and q transmit a message at the same time, then if there exists a node r that is a direct neighbor of both, then r will not receive either message, in which case we say that there was a collision. Yet, we assume that a message is delivered with positive probability.
Each device p holds a private key k p , known only to itself, with which p can digitally sign every message it sends [38] . It is also assumed that each device can obtain the public key of every other device, and can thus authenticate the sender of any signed message.
Finally, we assume an abstract entity called an overlay, which is simply a collection of nodes. Nodes that belong to the overlay are called overlay nodes. Nodes that do not belong to the overlay are called non-overlay nodes. In the following OV ERLAY refers to the set of nodes that belong to the overlay and OL(1, p) ≡ N (1, p) OV ERLAY (the neighbors of p that belong to the overlay). Later in this paper we give examples of a couple of known overlay maintenance protocols that we adapted to our environment.
Byzantine Failures: Up to f out of the total of n nodes in the system may be Byzantine, meaning that they can arbitrarily deviate from their protocol. In particular, Byzantine processes may fail to send messages, send too many messages, send messages with false information, or send messages with different data to different nodes. We also assume that correct and Byzantine processes are spread such that the transitive closure of the transmission disks of correct nodes form a connected graph (clearly, without this assumption, it is impossible to ensure dissemination of messages to all correct nodes). In particular, we assume that Byzantine nodes do not jam the network by constantly broadcasting noise. Dealing with jamming can only be done by employing frequency hopping techniques [10] , yet is orthogonal to other Byzantine issues.
Yet, a node cannot impersonate to another node, which is achieved using digital signatures [38] (in the implementation of our protocol we use the DSA protocol [38] ). Nodes that follow their protocol are called correct. If a node is correct, then it is presumed to be correct throughout the execution of the protocol. A node p that sends a message m is called the originator of m. The digital signature of m is denoted sig(m).
Failure Detectors and Nodes' Architecture: As mentioned in the Introduction, we assume that each node is equipped with three types of failure detectors, Mute, Verbose, and Trust (see also illustration in Figure 1 ). We further assume that each message has a header part and a data part. The header part can be anticipated based on local information only while the For example, the type of message (application data, gossip, request for retransmission, etc.), the id of the originator, and a sequence number of the message are part of the header. However, the information that the application level intended to send, or the actual gossiped information, is part of the data.
Based on this, we define a mute failure as failure to send a message with an expected header. Similarly, a verbose failure is sending messages too often. Note that both types of failures can be detected accurately in a synchronous system based on local knowledge only. This is because in synchronous systems each message has a known bounded deadline, so it is possible to tell that a message is missing. Similarly, it is possible to accurately measure the rate of messages received and verify that it is below an agreed upon threshold.
Obtaining synchronous communication in ad-hoc networks with standard hardware and OS is extremely difficult. Yet, observations of communication networks indicate that they tend to behave in a timely manner for large fractions of the time. This is captured by the notion of the class ♦P mute of failure detectors [4, 15, 21] . Such failure detectors are assumed to eventually (i.e., during periods of timely network behavior) detect mute failures accurately. In this eventuality, all nodes that suffer a mute failure are suspected (known as completeness) and only such nodes are suspected (known as accuracy). This approach has the benefit that all synchrony assumptions are encapsulated behind the functional specification of the failure detector (i.e., its ability to eventually detect mute failures in an accurate manner). This also frees protocols that are based on such failure detectors from the implementation details related to timers and timeouts, thus making them both more general and more robust.
In a similar manner to ♦P mute , we can defined ♦P verbose as a class of failure detectors that eventually reliably detect verbose failure. We assume that the failure detector Mute is in the class ♦P mute while Verbose is in the class ♦P verbose .
The failure detector Trust collects reports of Mute and Verbose, as well as detections of messages with bad signatures and other locally observable deviations from the protocol. Trust maintains a trust level for each neighboring node. This information is consumed by the overlay, as illustrated in Figure 1 . As we describe later in the paper, the information obtained from Trust is used to ensure that there are enough correct nodes in the overlay so that the correct nodes of the overlay form a connected graph and that each correct node is within the transmission disk of an overlay node that does not exhibit detectable Byzantine behavior.
The Dissemination Protocol
Our protocol includes three concurrent tasks. First, messages are disseminated over the overlay by the overlay nodes. Second, signatures about sent messages are gossiped among all nodes in the system. This allows all nodes to learn about the existence of messages they did not receive either due to collisions or due to a Byzantine behavior by an overlay node. When a node p discovers that it misses a message following a gossip it heard from q, then p requests the missing message from q as well as from its overlay neighbors. The third task is the maintenance of the overlay, whose goal is to ensure that the evolving overlay indeed disseminates messages to all correct nodes. Notice that overlay maintenance messages can be piggybacked on gossip messages. For lack of space, the proofs have been dropped from this version. For the same reason, obvious optimizations, such as batching gossip messages, are not described.
Interfacing with the Failure Detectors
Recall that the Mute failure detector detects when a process fails to send a message with a header it is supposed to. To notify this failure detector about such messages, its interface includes one method called expect. This method accepts as parameters a message header to look for, a set of nodes that are supposed to send this message, and an indication if all of these nodes must send the message or only one of them is enough. Note that the header passed to this method can include wild cards as well as exact values for each of the header's fields. In this paper we do not focus on how such a failure detector is implemented. Intuitively, a simple implementation consists of setting a timeout for each message reported to the failure detector with the expect method. When the timer times out, the corresponding nodes that failed to send anticipated messages are suspected for a certain period of time (see discussion in [15] ).
The Verbose failure detector detects verbose nodes. Such nodes try to overload the system by sending too many messages that may cause other nodes to react with messages of their own, thereby degrading the performance of the system. Detecting such nodes is therefore useful in order to allow nodes to stop reacting to messages from these nodes.
a given message; the existence of such messages "prove" that the node in question has generated an unnecessary message.
Finally, the Trust failure detector maintains a trust level for any node known to it. Each time its suspect method is called, the trust level of the corresponding node is decreased by some number that depends on the suspicion reason. Once it goes below a threshold, the corresponding node is suspected. Moreover, to recover from mistakes, the trust level slowly grows, e.g., every few time units without suspect being invoked again (such an aging mechanism also exists in the Mute and Verbose failure detectors). N (1, p) . However, if m does not fit sig(m), then m is ignored and the process that sent it is suspected by the Trust failure detector. (4) If a node p receives a message m it has already received beforehand, then m is ignored.
The Main Protocol
When a node p receives a message m for the first time, then p first verifies that sig(m) matches m. If it does, then p accepts m. Moreover, if p is also an overlay node, then p forwards m to all nodes in
Gossiping and Message Recovery
Intuitively, the idea here is that nodes gossip about messages they received (or sent) to all their neighbors. This way, if a node hears a gossip about a message that it has never received, it can explicitly ask the message both from its overlay neighbor and from the node from which it received the gossip. If any of the contacted nodes has the message, it forwards it to the requesting node. Messages can be purged either after a timeout, or by using a stability detection mechanism. Here we use timeout based purging due to its simplicity.
Additionally, there are several mechanisms in place to overcome Byzantine failures (in addition to digital signatures). In order to prevent a Byzantine overlay node from blocking the dissemination of a message, searching a missing message can be initiated by limited flooding with TTL 2, which ensures that the recovery request will reach beyond a single Byzantine overlay node. This, in addition to requesting the message from the process that gossiped about its existence. Also, when a node feels that it received a request for a missing message too often, or that such a request is unjustified, it notifies the Verbose failure detector about it. More accurately, the gossiping and message recovery task is composed of the following subtasks:
1. When a node p receives a gossip header(m) for a message m it has already received before, then p gossips header(m) with the other N (1, p) nodes. Otherwise, p ignores such gossips. In particular, p only gossips about messages it has already received and does not forward gossips about messages it has not receive yet. This is done in order to make the recovery process more efficient, and in order to help detect mute failures more accurately.
When p receives a gossip header(m) for a message
m it has not received, p asks its overlay neighbors and the sender of the gossip to forward m to it using a REQUEST MSG message.
If p receives header(m) messages from more than sig proofs threshold other nodes, or when some timeout has passed since p got the first header(m)
message, yet p still has not received m, then p asks the overlay neighbors in 2 hop distance (using flooding with TTL=2) as well as one of the nodes q from which p received header(m) to forward m to it. Essentially, this situation is likely to happen if the nearest overlay neighbor, or its neighbor, is mute. By approaching the overlay neighbors at distance 2, we can bypass such mute overlay nodes. Note that if p does not receive the requested message, then eventually this will trigger the Mute failure detector at p to suspect p's 2 hop overlay neighbors (which in return will eventually lead to electing another node to the overlay). (2, p) . This is in order to make sure that if its overlay neighbor is mute, it will be detected and eventually replaced.
7. When an overlay node p receives a FAULTY MSG message for m from a node q ∈ N (1, p) and p has m, then p will broadcast m (to its other immediate neighbors). There are two reasons why p forwards the message in a broadcast and not using a pointto-point message: (1) if one of p's neighbors was missing the message, it is likely that many of them miss the message, and (2) as listed in Item 8 below, if any of the overlay neighbors r of p has forwarded m to p and does not hear p forwarding it again, then r will suspect that p is mute.
8. When an overlay node p receives a FAULTY MSG message for m from a node q ∈ N (1, p) and p has m, then p broadcast m. Following this, p instructs its Mute failure detector to expect a retransmission of m by all its overlay neighbors. Failure by any of them to do so will eventually lead the Mute failure detector of p to suspect such a node.
Overlay Maintenance
The work of [18] describes two overlay maintenance protocols, one based on Connected Dominating Set (CDS) and the other based on a Maximal Independent Set with Bridges (MIS+B).
3 Both protocols are described in [18] in a self-stabilizing manner, in which nodes are elected to the overlay based on the notion of a goodness number. Intuitively, this helps choosing the best nodes, under a given metric, to the overlay. Moreover, by the use of goodness number and by assigning lowest goodness numbers to suspected nodes we ensure that Byzantine nodes cannot prevent these protocol from constructing a useful overlay. We adopt this approach, but augment it such that the goodness number becomes a tuple that includes the trust level as the first parameter. For lack of space, the details are only provided in the full version of the paper. Notice that by definition, Byzantine nodes can claim to be in the overlay. Thus, correct nodes ignore such claims made by nodes they suspect and may elect themselves to the overlay even if they have suspected neighboring nodes that already claim to be part of the overlay.
Results
We have measured the performance of our protocol using the SWANS/JIST simulator [1]. In the simulations, we have compared the performance of our protocol with the performance of flooding on one hand and of simple dissemination along an overlay (without recovery of lost messages). Here, flooding is an example of a very robust protocol against maliciousness, but also very wasteful. At the other extreme, dissemination along an overlay without message recovery is very efficient, but very unreliable as well. We have measured the percentage of messages delivered to all nodes, the latency to deliver a message to all and to most of the nodes, and the load imposed on the network. It is also important to note that our performance measurements included the overhead of the overlay maintenance as well as the gossip messages (although overlay maintenance are piggybacked on gossip messages).
In order to reduce the number of collisions, we have employed a staggering technique. That is, each time a node is supposed to send a message, it delays the sending by a random period of up to several milliseconds.
In the simulations, mobility was modelled by the Random-Waypoint model [25] . In this model, each node picks a random target location and moves there at a randomly chosen speed. The node then waits for a random amount of time and then chooses a new location etc. In our case, the speed of movement ranged from 0.5-1.5 m/s, which corresponds to walking speed. Also, the maximal waiting time was set to 20 seconds. Each simulation lasted 5 minutes (of simulation time) and each data point was generated as an average of 10 runs. The transmission range was set to roughly 80 meters 4 with a simulation area of 200x200 meters, the message size was set to 1KB (less than one UDP/IP packet), and the network bandwidth to 1Mbps. In each simulation, two nodes were generating messages at variable rates. We have run simulations with varying number of nodes, but discovered that with the exception of very sparse networks, the results are qualitatively the same. Thus, we only present the results when the number of nodes is fixed at 200. In the graphs, we denote the flooding protocol by FLOODING, our Byzantine dissemination protocol by BDP(MIS) and BDP(CDS) depending on the overlay mechanism used (see Section 3.3), and by OVERLAY(MIS) and OVER-LAY(CDS) the simple overlay dissemination mechanism that has no message recovery. We limited the number of times each message is gossiped to two. Addi-tional gossip attempts slightly improve the delivery ratios, but at the cost of additional messages. Finally, the main Byzantine behavior checked was of being mute, as this has the most adverse affect on the performance.
As can be seen in the various performance graphs, the delivery ratio of our protocol, BDP, is very close to that of flooding including when nodes are mobile and/or Byzantine. On the other hand, the delivery ratio of the non-fault resilient protocol, OVERLAY, drops dramatically in the face of mobility or Byzantine behavior. On the other hand, when considering network load, when there are no Byzantine failures, the performance of our BDP protocol is very close to the performance of OVERLAY. Only when there are Byzantine nodes, BDP generates significantly more traffic than OVERLAY, which approaches FLOOD-ING as the number of Byzantine nodes increase. However, BDP (as well as FLOODING), deliver most messages in these cases whereas OVERLAY only deliver a small fraction of the messages. For lack of space, we did not include the latency measurements. In general, all protocols deliver messages fast. Yet, in the face of Byzantine failures, the latency for BDP to deliver a message to the last few nodes may reach a few seconds, due to the need to rely on the periodic gossip mechanism. Finally, our simulations have discovered the following interesting anecdote: when nodes are mobile, Byzantine behavior has lower impact on the performance of the non-fault-resilient protocol. This is because when nodes are mobile, the chances that Byzantine nodes are placed in the overlay for a long time and manage to all messages is much smaller.
Related Work
A good survey of broadcast and multicast protocols for wireless ad hoc networks can be found in [40] . In particular, (multicast) routing in MANET can be classified into proactive, e.g., OLSR [11] , reactive, e.g., AODV [35] and DSR [25] , and mixtures of both, e.g., ZRP [23] , as well as geographic routing [26, 27] . These protocols, however, ignore Byzantine failures.
Spanning tree based overlays have been often used as the main scheme for disseminating messages to large groups, e.g., in IP multicast [34, 39] and in the MBone [17] . More sophisticated overlays such as hypercubes, Harary graphs, and DHTs have been explored, e.g., in [19, 28, 36] .
The idea that a process can detect that it is missing a message by exchanging messages with other processes first appeared, to the best of our knowledge, in the MNAK layer of the Ensemble system in 1996 [24] . Additionally, randomized gossip has been used as a method of ensuring reliable delivery of broadcast/multicast messages while maintaining high throughput in the PBcast/Bi-modal work [5] as well as in several followup papers, e.g., [16] . In these works it is assumed that a node can choose with whom it wishes to gossip, and does so in a random manner. In contrast, in our case gossiping is done with all neighbors that are physically decided by the movement of nodes and transmission ranges. Also, the works of [5, 16, 24] ignored Byzantine failures.
There has been a lot of work on securing point-topoint routing schemes against malicious nodes. Due to space limitations, we will only mention a few of them. One example is the protocol presented in [2] . In this work, the authors describe a mechanism for detecting malicious faults along a path and then discovering alternative paths. Another secure routing protocol (SRP) has been proposed in [32] . SRP requires a secure association between each pair of source and destination but assumes that Byzantine nodes do not collude. Yet another protocol, SMT [33] , protects pairwise communication by breaking the message into several pieces based on a coding scheme that allows reconstructing the message even when some pieces are lost. Each piece is then sent along a different path. Additional examples of secure point-to-point routing include, e.g,. [37, 43, 44] .
The work of Minsky and Schneider [31] explored disseminating information using gossip in wired networks, when some nodes can be faulty. This is by only trusting gossips that have gained the support of at least f + 1 nodes, where f is the number of potential Byzantine nodes. Several other works have also proposed a Byzantine multicast scheme that sends a message along f + 1 distinct paths [13, 29] . Similarly, using multiple paths chosen in a stochastic manner in order to reduce the possibility of interception have been studied in [6] .
Reliable Byzantine tolerant broadcast in networks where all nodes can communicate directly with each other has been formally described in [7] , and has been explored, e.g., in [13, 30] . Also, the works in [3, 8] have proposed a formal framework for defining and implementing reliable multicast protocols in a hybrid failure environment (Byzantine, crash, and omission) based on modern cryptography. In particular, they have investigated the computational complexity of such protocols.
A framework for fault-tolerance by adaptation was proposed in [9] . In that framework, a simple protocol is run during normal operation alongside some failure detection mechanism. Once a failure is detected, the execution switches to a masking protocol. This idea was demonstrated in [9] on the broadcast problem, which results in a somewhat similar solution to ours. Yet, in [9] it is not mentioned how the overlay (a tree in their case) is maintained. Also, the masking protocol was flooding, whereas we avoid flooding even when failures are detected. Instead, in our approach, local message recovery is first attempted. Moreover, in [9] it was not explained when and how to return to the simple protocol once a failure is compensated for. Finally, our work encapsulates failure detection behind failure detectors, which results in a modular implementation. Mute failure detectors were initially proposed in [15] in order to solve Byzantine Consensus in otherwise asynchronous systems. They were later used also in [4, 21] . Moreover, the use of a trusted timely control channel, called TTCB, was explored as another mean of solving Byzantine Consensus efficiently in [12] . In fact, TTCB can be used to implement mute failure detectors. For example, when each node has both WiFi and cellular communication, one might be able to implement a TTCB using cellular communication while sending normal data using WiFi.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this work we have described a Byzantine tolerant broadcast protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. The protocol disseminates messages along the arcs of a logical overlay. The protocol relies on signatures to prevent messages from being forged. It also employs gossiping of headers of known messages to prevent a Byzantine overlay node from stopping the dissemination of messages to the rest of the system. Additionally, for efficiency reasons, the overlay maintenance mechanism is augmented to ensure that enough correct nodes are elected to the overlay so that Byzantine nodes do not disconnect the overlay beyond the time required to detect such behavior. Finally, the detection of observable Byzantine behaviors, such as mute and verbose failures, are encapsulated within corresponding failure detectors modules. The use of failure detectors simplifies the presentation of the protocol and makes it more generic and robust. This is because the protocol need not deal explicitly with issues like timers and timeouts.
